RE: [Geopriv]WGLCondraft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-00(PIDF-LOdigitalsignatures)

Date: Mon Feb 26 2007 - 21:50:02 EST


< Given that ALIs, etc... are all spoofable on the PSTN today and we
see not real outcry about it>

When E9-1-1 was first introduced, there was no way at that time that the ANI could be spoofed. It has been engineered to be secured. Technology evolution on the PSTN created some "security holes" and the Emergency Services community is quite concern about those.

While I can't speak on the cost of doing it now or later, I can see the value of trying to make the information secure at the onset.

What I've read so far on this issue is that there was some kind of general agreement on the value for signed LOs until the following caveat were brought to light:

1) Does not cover bot net attacks;
2) May create a false sense of trust at a PSAP (changing the threat vector).

For 1), it was mentioned this was a generalized threat to the Internet. It may not be for this solution to solve it then.

For 2), in the case where the signed LO (SLO) is passed to the PSAP, it should not preclude the call taker to confirm the address with the caller. This is normal procedures. Actually, a signed LO should not create a higher sense of trust as with a call from the PSTN today, but the lack of signature on the LO should raise suspicion and direct the call taker to take special care with that call.

Guy Caron
-----Message d'origine-----
De : Andrew Newton []
Envoyé : 26 février 2007 20:43
À : Dawson, Martin
Cc : GEOPRIV; Marc Linsner
Objet : Re: [Geopriv]WGLCondraft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-00(PIDF-LOdigitalsignatures)

On Feb 26, 2007, at 7:16 PM, Dawson, Martin wrote:

> I believe that if we didn't
> introduce the location integrity mechanism now, we would need to
> add it
> at some point in the near future at which point the cost of doing so
> will be considerably higher.

Given that ALIs, etc... are all spoofable on the PSTN today and we
see not real outcry about it, musing that it will cost us more to add
security we know we will need later is speculative, especially when
the security we spec today based on what we think we need maybe too
burdensome, insecure, or both.

> If bot nets are the convenient source of compromised machines - then a
> federal law enforcement agency would be able to hire that same net to
> mount a DOS on their own honey-pot service.

Which mythical federal law enforcement agency are you referencing?


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