RE: [Geopriv]WGLCondraft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-00(PIDF-LOdigitalsignatures)

From: Dawson, Martin ^lt;Martin.Dawson@andrew.com>
Date: Wed Mar 07 2007 - 18:15:54 EST

No - I mean the source of the "location information" - not the source of the call. Cheers, Martin ________________________________ From: Brian Rosen [mailto:br@brianrosen.net] Sent: Thursday, 8 March 2007 9:46 AM To: Dawson, Martin; 'Andrew Newton' Cc: geopriv@ietf.org; 'Marc Linsner' Subject: RE: [Geopriv]WGLCondraft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-00(PIDF-LOdigitalsignatures) Umm, source identity checking won't work. The identity the LIS understands may not be the identity in the call (because, for example a NAT or VPN is in the path). The endpoint may have a valid location or reference to give to the calling network, but you can't check that the identity related to the location is the same as that in the call. We could come up with other identities that could be used, but the one we keep talking about (IP Address) won't work. We would need to do some kind of shared secret processing between the triad of the LIS, the endpoint and the calling network. That could prove that the entity getting the location was the same entity sending the call. Brian ________________________________ From: Dawson, Martin [mailto:Martin.Dawson@andrew.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2007 4:55 PM To: Andrew Newton; Brian Rosen Cc: geopriv@ietf.org; Marc Linsner Subject: RE: [Geopriv]WGLCondraft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-00(PIDF-LOdigitalsignatures) Gee - I got bagged out for suggesting that the dereferencing mechanism obviated the concern about temporal and identity integrity for location information quite some time ago. Must be OK now. Dereferencing does remove the concerns with respect to knowing that the location really does apply now (temporal) and that it is applicable to a specific end-device (identity) - which addresses the main replay concerns. The other component of location dependability is the "source identity". That is, that the LIS operator is a recognised and trusted access operator. This can be achieved by some independent certificate exchange process - or it could be achieved just by having the dereferencer request a signed location anyway; that would be the same process for the LIS on the northbound and southbound interfaces. Cheers, Martin ________________________________ From: Andrew Newton [mailto:andy@hxr.us] Sent: Thursday, 8 March 2007 5:39 AM To: Brian Rosen Cc: geopriv@ietf.org; 'Marc Linsner' Subject: Re: [Geopriv]WGLCondraft-ietf-geopriv-l7-lcp-ps-00(PIDF-LOdigitalsignatures) On Mar 7, 2007, at 1:32 PM, Brian Rosen wrote: I'd guess we would be better off just using a location reference though. That's an interesting thought. The channel security of the dereference means that you don't have to sign the location to trust it. -andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------ This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise private information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any unauthorized use of this email is prohibited. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------ [mf2] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise private information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any unauthorized use of this email is prohibited. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [mf2]

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Received on Wed, 7 Mar 2007 17:15:54 -0600

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