Re: [Geopriv] RE: Strawman Proposal

We mentioned the idea of putting two PIDF-LOs into a SIP signaling
message, namely one for routing and another one for consumption at the PSAP.
The one for routing does not need to provide a perfect precision, as we
know. For some countries it would be sufficient to use state granularity
to hit the correct PSAP.

I am also addressing those people who argue that "Operators will never
provide location information to the end host because they want to make
money with location-based applications. Hence, they can only use
location-by-reference".

I don't want to create relationships between every VoIP provider and
every access network provider in the world because I believe that this
will do a lot of harm to the Internet. I am OK with a relationship
between access network provider and PSAPs even though I see a lot of
problems there as well.

If we have to use a location-by-reference mechanism for these operators
then we don't need location signing.

I doubt that signed location information can be demanded for all
emergency service calls since we will even see calls with absolutely no
location information at all. Furthermore, we would have to tell the IEEE
to go home since none of their solution does any sort of signing.

Ciao
Hannes

Richard Barnes wrote:
>> Take a large campus with thousands of offices. Unless you have a
>> fairly elaborate delegation mechanism, somebody externally will have
>> to sign for each and every room. This means that the organization has
>> to operate a CA that is trusted by the proposed VESA entity, for
>> example. We can't even get delegation to work within Internet2 and
>> Columbia.
>
> Location granularity and certification granularity are two orthogonal
> issues. If there's one server that knows the geography of the whole
> Columbia campus, then there's only one certificate to manage. If you
> have one per building, then you have might a few more, or you might
> have each server reach back to a central signing server for a signature.
>
> --RB
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> [AJW] It is not clear to me how authenticating millions of users and
>>> their multitude of identity mechanisms is any less daunting than
>>>
>>
>> We have such a mechanism, e.g., within IMS, namely P-Asserted-ID,
>> which is very widely deployed, from what I can tell. Or the SIP
>> identity mechanism, although that seems to just start getting
>> traction. The PSAP wouldn't care whether and how the VSP verified the
>> customer identity; it just gets a single client cert from the VSP in
>> a TLS connection.
>>
>> You probably missed the discussion on this years ago, but your
>> concern and the perceived difficulties of a global PKI motivated the
>> current mechanism, as it only requires what customers must have
>> already, namely a shared secret with their VSP, and web-style
>> cross-provider trust with a single cert for each provider.
>>
>>
>>> providing accreditation to potentially thousands of access network
>>> providers. But perhaps I am missing the point. That said, if you couple
>>> this with signed location then you have the whole gamut. See location
>>> dependability draft
>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-geopriv-location-dependability-
>>>
>>> 00
>>>
>>>>
>>>> PS: I also believe that the PSAP operator would accept calls that
>>> don't
>>>> have any location attached to it. How many calls today have location
>>>> information available? Do we have some statistics about it?
>>>>
>>>
>>> [AJW] All emergency calls in the world have some degree of location
>>> provided (inferred), though in some cases this may not be fantastically
>>> accurate, country level. In the United States for wireline it is based
>>> on the calling line ID, and either an ESRD (roughly representing a
>>> cell)
>>> or an ESRK (representing a rough calling area) for wireless.
>>>
>>> Perhaps, like some other working groups we need to make the distinction
>>> between support and implement. I am asking that the requirements
>>> include
>>> support for it, I think that implementation will be something that
>>> jurisdictions have the option to do or not.
>>
>> This doesn't quite work, given that phones need to work universally.
>> I don't want to buy a phone in Prague, say, that suddenly can't make
>> an emergency call in New York city.
>>
>> Henning
>>
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>
>
>
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Received on Tue, 13 Mar 2007 22:53:42 +0100